Secure SCADA Field Test
Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems are used to monitor and control the generation, transmission, and distribution of electrical energy. They are also used in gas, water, waste water, and other industries. Typically, a SCADA system consists of many different computer systems and intelligent electric devices (IED), all monitored and controlled by one master system. Because a SCADA system can be implemented over a vast geographical area, communication between the master and these remote devices is commonly done via dial-up, slow speed telephone lines or wireless networks, although communication speeds in the 1200 to 9600 baud range are common.

Historically, safety, functionality and the ability for a device to operate in adverse or hostile weather conditions were the primary focus of the SCADA system vendors. The lack of standards led to over 200 different SCADA protocols with little regard to security:
the typical SCADA protocol does not authenticate the communicating devices, and the request or control information is sent in clear-text format. Because the communication media itself is easily tapped, the SCADA system is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. Additionally, the physical distance between the SCADA master and remote locations gives an attacker ample opportunity to compromise a SCADA system.

A solution that addresses SCADA system vulnerabilities must balance data confidentiality against the primary goals of data integrity and availability, as well as take into account the likelihood that the attacker is familiar with SCADA systems and protocols. Additionally, any security enhancements made to existing SCADA systems needs to be done with the low-bandwidth communication environment in mind. Large amounts of latency cannot be tolerated. Finally, encryption alone does not solve the problem because the data is predictable and encryption solutions are still vulnerable to message replay. Therefore, authentication of SCADA communications is the most effective way to mitigate the inherent risks in current SCADA systems.

Ongoing NCASSR-funded work at PNNL is close to demonstrating an enhancement to a common protocol used in SCADA systems that will provide secure SCADA communications without the introduction of large amounts of latency. This involves adding a Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) to the protocol along with enhancements to provide for key exchanges and other “housekeeping” type functions. This technology is scheduled to be laboratory operational by late 2005. The goal of this research is to demonstrate the viability of HMAC authenticated SCADA communication in the electrical industry with low bandwidth communication environments through implementation into utility test and production environments.
 
Project Leads
Joseph Huffman, PNNL
Wayne Meitzler, PNNL

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The National Center for Advanced Secure Systems Research NCASSR) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) is a multi-institutional cybersecurity research team. NCASSR focuses basic and applied research necessary to develop next generation information security technologies that address national cybersecurity needs. NCASSR is led by the National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) and supported by funding from the Office of Naval Research (ONR).


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